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Abstract 
 
In this paper, the author examines two different phenomenological frameworks for values: 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and Scheler’s phenomenology. Given the popularity of 
hermeneutic phenomenology inspired by Heidegger’s efforts, the author openly questions if val-
ues can be accommodated in that framework. The author suggests that those paying attention to 
the lived-experience of values consider Scheler’s phenomenology of value as a more refined al-
ternative to make sense of value-experience and cultural practices more generally. 
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In this paper, I explore the possibility of how 
value can be given in both Heidegger and 
Scheler. The “how of givenness” is the man-
ner in which some thing can be given, or ac-
cessed phenomenologically. Thus, if we take 
a look at both Scheler and Heidegger, we can 
address their conceptions of phenomenology 
as limiting and enabling the givenness of val-
ue. On a whole, phenomenology’s develop-
ment issues more from Heidegger’s influence 
than Scheler. Heidegger interprets value as 
present-at-hand and I argue this follows from 
the limits imposed by his hermeneutic phe-
nomenology. Values are ontic for Heidegger. 
In Scheler’s magnum opus the Formalismus, 
he is silent on what values are exactly, but 
describes them as given. Scholars familiar 
with Scheler’s work will note that many times 
in the Formalismus, Scheler will assert the 
ideality of value and refer to the rank of val-
ues as an eternal order. However, he will nev-
er spell out the ontological nature of value nor 
how it is that they are eternal. Thus, if we can 
establish the givenness of value itself and 
what that requires independently of either 
phenomenology, then we can recommend ei-
ther Heidegger or Scheler’s phenomenologi-
cal approach. Thus, this paper is not an analy-
sis of the historical relation between Scheler 
and Heidegger. Rather, this paper works out 
value’s givenness itself in relation by consid-
ering two phenomenological frameworks to-
gether.  
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After working out value’s givenness and 
seeing which phenomenology can best ac-
commodate value, I will show the applicable 
upshot of Scheler’s thought to an applied 
problem. I will show that disagreements over 
the management and accessibility to health 
care in the United States invert the absolute 
value and overwhelming fullness of persons. 
This example serves to show the theoretical 
benefit of adopting a hermeneutics of value 
rooted in Scheler’s thought more generally 
and further evinces the problematic silence 
plaguing Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenome-
nology about the prominent role values play 
in our experience at a fundamental and onto-
logical level.  
 
Introduction to the Problem 
 
Scheler offered tiny clues in the Formalismus 
as to what he thought phenomenology could 
do for him. These insights were given in the 
introduction between the central preoccupa-
tions of method. For Heidegger, phenomenol-
ogy was the way into working out the prob-
lem of Being in his fundamental ontology in 
Being and Time, yet the problem presented 
itself when Heidegger construed phenome-
nology as a hermeneutic turn. While Scheler 
was not necessarily preoccupied with method 
in the same way Heidegger responded to Hus-
serl, Scheler can still be analyzed in terms of 
what he claimed about phenomenology in the 
Formalismus. Primarily, Scheler was interest-
ed in developing his personalism against the 
background of Kant’s moral philosophy. We 
must look passed the Formalismus. Heidegger 
was preoccupied with method, but 
Heidegger’s “method” comes across indirect-
ly as a consequence of interrogating Dasein 
about the question of the meaning of Being 
and the history of ontology. 
 
In what follows, I want to ask the ques-
tions: What is the givenness of value? How is 
value experienced in its givenness? If I can 
answer these questions, then it is the phenom-
enological criterion of value itself that can 
answer which phenomenological framework 
better suits value’s givenness. I will first dis-
cuss Scheler and then move to Heidegger. 
 
I. Scheler’s Intuition of Essences 
 
Scheler’s conception of phenomenology is 
given in Chapter 2 of the Formalismus. In the 
Formalismus, he outlined his concepts of the 
a priori and phenomenological intuition, or 
what he called “essential intuiting” (We-
sensschau). Scheler designated “as ‘a priori’ 
all those ideal units of meaning and those 
propositions that are self-given by way of an 
immediate intuitive content in the absence of 
any kind of positing” (Scheler, 1973a, p. 48). 
Like Husserl, phenomenology is opposed to 
the natural attitude and is therefore a special 
type of experience (Frings, 1996, p. 18). In 
the natural attitude, we regard phenomena as 
a natural fact described by the sciences, and in 
this standpoint, phenomena are described 
from a third-person perspective. The natural 
attitude seeks only to describe from an objec-
tive or impartial perspective. It does not pay 
attention to how phenomena are disclosed to 
us in the first-person perspective, and the nat-
ural attitude takes for granted the sense-
constituting role of subjectivity in experience. 
The natural attitude reveals phenomena in 
their non-experienced features and has, there-
fore, a skewed interpretation. Phenomenolog-
ical description is the attempt to render expe-
riential elements clear that undergird and con-
stitute experience itself as we truly live 
through them by remaining true to both the 
subjectivity of the experiencer and the en-
joined constituted object. If I told my wife 
that love is merely the evolutionary adaptive 
strategy to facilitate human pair-bonding and 
that we need not concern ourselves with the 
actual content of love (as it is lived), I would 
seriously disregard what it means to be in 
love in the first place. Moreover, the third-
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person perspective does not and cannot ad-
dress what it is like to be in love. 1  Thus, 
Scheler opposed the propensity of the natural 
attitude to posit and take for granted the ori-
gins of how acts constitute the meaning of 
phenomena. Instead, meaning-constitution of 
an act can only be apprehended in absolute 
immanence and we must pay specific atten-
tion to what is given in experience. What is 
given in experience is how a phenomenon is 
lived through within experience. For Scheler, 
attempting a description is more line with an 
attitudinal approach than a well-established 
method. This also marks a considerable dif-
ference between him and Husserl. 
 
…phenomenology is neither the name of a 
new science nor a substitute for the word 
philosophy; it is the name of an attitude of 
spiritual seeing in which one can see or 
experience something which otherwise 
remains hidden, namely, a realm of facts 
of a particular kind. I say attitude, not 
method. A method is a goal-directed pro-
cedure for thinking about facts…before 
they have been fixed by logic, and second, 
of a procedure of seeing… That which is 
seen and experienced is given only in the 
seeing and experiencing of the act itself, 
in its being acted out; it appears in that act 
and only in it. (Scheler, 1973b, pp. 137-
138)  
 
For Scheler, phenomenological description is 
about describing the sphere of acts in which 
we experience the world. As products of 
“spiritual seeing,” these descriptions aim at 
the primordial acts prior to all other cognition 
and experience. In such a way, the phenome-
nologist attempts to retrieve the “most in-
tensely vital and most immediate contact with 
the world itself, that is with those things in the 
world with which it is concerned and these 
things as they are immediately given to expe-
rience” (Scheler, 1973b, p. 138). Experience, 
according to Scheler, means the immediately 
given nature of phenomena and these phe-
nomena “are ‘in themselves there’ only in this 
act (Scheler, 1973b, p. 138). It is only within 
the sphere of acts in which we have a living 
contact with the world, and it is only as a uni-
ty of these acts we experience each other as 
persons. 
 
For Scheler, the immediate apprehension 
of whatness/essence cannot be disclosed by 
scientific thinking at all. Instead, the content 
of that immediate apprehension is what ena-
bles our efforts to understand science. Es-
sences reveal the intelligibility and meaning 
of the world given in experience. Then, sci-
ence is an abstraction of phenomenological 
experience. In Scheler’s terms, “we can also 
say that essences and their interconnections 
are a priori “given” “prior” to all experience” 
(Scheler, 1973a, p. 49). Scheler equated phe-
nomenological intuition with phenomenologi-
cal experience (Scheler, 1973a, p. 48). 
 
In phenomenology, this connection be-
tween act-center and the world is collapsed in 
how experience is undergone, and this is 
called “intentionality.” The act-center is con-
sciousness of something. Anytime I am fear-
ful, I am fearful of the spider. When I per-
ceive, I am perceiving the tree. There is no 
moment in which consciousness is not taking 
an object. Thus, we are constantly undergoing 
moments of intentional relation with the 
world, and it is phenomenology that attempts 
to retrieve how it is that experience is under-
gone by careful attention to what we intuit as 
given within this intentional structure. Schel-
er’s term for intentionality that emphasizes 
the constant unfolding linkage of acts and the 
world is interconnection. 
 
An essence is not mysterious for the phe-
nomenologist. Instead, essence refers only to 
‘what-ness’ of a thing (Was-sein). For Scheler, 
it does not refer to a universal or particular 
concept of a thing. For example, if I have a 
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blue thing in front of me, the essence “blue” 
is given in the universal concept of the thing 
as well as the particular experience of the 
thing in question. Therefore, the essence is the 
whatness that carries over into both the uni-
versal and particular conception of a thing. In 
this way, the phenomenological essence is 
neither a particular thing, or a universal ab-
straction or ideality. Instead, the phenomeno-
logical essence is the mode of givenness ex-
hibited within experience and these modes of 
givenness constitute experience of the phe-
nomenon as such. Therefore, it is wrong to 
say that the phenomenological content can be 
reified to support any particular ontology, and 
this is the reason why Philip Blosser articulat-
ed the weakness of Scheler’s thought and re-
lationship it has acquired in relation to 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. On this, 
Blosser wrote 
  
…the chief defect of Scheler’s phenome-
nology, like all philosophies of value, was 
the weakness of his treatment of the on-
tology of values. The insufficient devel-
opment of this fundamental aspect of Val-
ue Theory has left it especially vulnerable 
in a philosophical climate that has been 
distinguished, since the 1930s, by the ma-
jor “growth industry” of Heideggerian on-
tology, making this appear probably the 
most critical defect of Scheler’s Formal-
ismus. (Blosser, 1995, p. 16)  
 
Blosser is not alone in his assessment. In ad-
dition, Stephen Schneck claimed “(i)n accept-
ing phenomenology, Scheler was already 
steeped in the life philosophies and was 
committed to an unrefined metaphysical posi-
tion to an as yet undefined metaphysical posi-
tion” (Schneck, 1987, p. 31). Scheler’s sense 
of ontology remained tenuous and was not 
fully developed in the Formalismus in a com-
plete sense. Support for this interpretation can 
also be seen in what little Scheler wrote about 
essences.  
 
Essences fill out both sides of the inter-
connection in terms of acts and propositions. 
Let me describe the latter. Scheler wrote 
 
Whenever we have such essences and 
such interconnections among them, the 
truth of propositions that find their ful-
fillment in such essences is totally inde-
pendent of the entire sphere of observa-
tion and description, as well as of what is 
established in inductive experience. This 
truth is also independent, quite obviously 
of all that enters into causal explanation. It 
can neither be verified nor refuted by this 
kind of “experience.” (Scheler, 1973a, p. 
49) 
  
In other words, essences locate the intercon-
nections between what is given originally pri-
or to experience to such an extent that this 
originally prior sense is independent of the 
empirical determinations about experience. 
However, he did not develop what it means 
for phenomenology to be independent. The 
term “independent” follows from Scheler’s 
description of “immanent experience.” By 
immanent, he meant “only what is intuitively 
in an act of experiencing” and by contrast, 
“non-phenomenological experience is in prin-
ciple an experience through or by means of 
symbols and, hence mediated experience that 
never gives things “themselves” (Scheler, 
1973a, p. 51). Thus, phenomenological de-
scriptions are independent from mediation of 
any symbols, or representations. In other 
words, they are not conditioned in any way, 
and immanence can only be disclosed to acts 
of experience, the being-in-an-act of experi-
ence.  
 
While Scheler may not have developed 
how phenomenological descriptions are inde-
pendent from the empirical sciences, Scheler 
did develop what he meant by phenomenolog-
ical independence in other works. In his Lehre 
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von den drei Tatsachen, Scheler described 
three levels of “pure facts.” First, the pure fact 
must identify a positive something (Etwas) as 
the sensory function through which this intui-
tive identity is established will be varied. Se-
cond, pure facts must serve as an ultimate 
foundation of the intuitive identified essence 
despite the changing nature of sensory content 
in which they are first experienced. Finally, 
the pure facts must be independent from the 
symbolic order in two ways. First, they must 
be independent from “the symbols with which 
it is possible for us to designate them” and 
second, they must be independent from “the 
symbols which are used in presenting the 
facts of which they are parts” (Scheler, 1973c, 
p. 299ff). If they are independent, then the 
connection between act and object must be 
independent as well, and this will allow the 
phenomenological descriptions to represent 
“what is not given in person” to others when 
sharing phenomenological results with others.  
Phenomenological facts are disclosed in acts 
but without any mediation. In this way, 
Scheler described the essential interconnec-
tions that are possible to address phenomeno-
logically. 
 
(1) the essences (and their interconnec-
tions) of the qualities and other thing-
contents (Sachgehalte) given in acts 
(things-phenomenology) (Sächphanome-
nologie); 
(2) the essences of acts themselves and 
their relations of foundation (phenome-
nology of acts or foundational orders);  
(3) their interconnections between the es-
sence of acts and those of things 
[zwischen Akt- und Sachwesenheiten] (e.g. 
values are given in feeling, colors in see-
ing, sounds in hearing etc.) (Scheler, 
1973a, pp. 71-72) 
 
Scheler’s ontological commitments are 
inadequately developed, and this makes them 
unclear. Did Scheler want to secure an onto-
logical underpinning for his personalism from 
the brief treatment he gave it in the Formal-
ismus? A passage in the Phenomenology and 
the Theory of Cognition provides support to 
such a reading linking his phenomenological 
efforts to future efforts of ontology. “Essential 
connections and essences have an ontological 
meeting from the start…the ontology of the 
spirit and world precedes any theory of cogni-
tion” (Scheler, 1973b, p. 158). Here, Scheler 
emphasized the independence of phenomeno-
logical description from the causal sciences, 
in particular various epistemic theories of 
cognition, must first presuppose the phenom-
enological priority of how spirit and world 
are first encountered in conscious acts. Those 
very same acts are accessed through the es-
sential intuiting of the phenomenological atti-
tude to render it clear how being-in-an-act 
relates to the world.  
 
In concluding this section, I explained 
some of the problematic features that accom-
pany Scheler’s thought about experience and 
how phenomena are given. I find Scheler’s 
Formalismus wanting because by itself the 
language of phenomenology cannot get us 
very far when it concerns the ontology of val-
ue unless phenomenology becomes ontology. 
Clearly, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenome-
nology provides an example of how phenom-
enology breaks into ontology, and it is where 
I turn to next. 
 
II. Heidegger’s Hermeneutical  
Phenomenology 
 
Heidegger operated with a more skeptical, but 
equally complex conception of phenomenolo-
gy. For Scheler, phenomenology accesses the 
foundations of meaning in personal acts that 
later become concealed and taken for granted 
in the empirical sciences, or what he called 
“mediated” through signs and symbols. 
Heidegger denied that a conception of phe-
nomenological experience can access imme-
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diately pure phenomena. For him, the herme-
neutic conception of phenomenology that 
arose in Being and Time conceives of the pos-
sibility of givenness as that which is always 
mediated, but brought into the clear. This dif-
ference will become apparent as I explain it 
from Section 31 and Section 32. Moreover, 
such focused attention on these two sections 
will illuminate methodological commitments 
Heidegger’s thought never abandoned. 
 
In what follows, I pay special attention to 
how this conception of phenomenology arises 
within the project of fundamental ontology 
and Being and Time as a whole. An entire 
work could trace out the consequences of 
hermeneutic phenomenology. Such an effort 
is certainly beyond the task of this work, but 
it is important also to keep in mind the meth-
odological differences between Scheler and 
Heidegger before any exposition of Scheler’s 
concepts and subsequent remedy can be in-
troduced to the problem of dearth of value in 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.  
 
A central feature of Heidegger’s funda-
mental ontology qua phenomenology in-
volves the analysis of human beings not as 
epistemic agents, but as “Dasein.” Dasein is 
being-in-the-world (Sein-in-der-Welt) and his 
name for “us.” Heidegger sought a solution to 
the meaning of Being in the very being that 
can pose the question before itself. It is there-
fore within Dasein (what Heidegger used as a 
phenomenological term to stand for any being 
that can pose the question of its own existence 
to itself) that this concern arises. Dasein is 
described as Being-in-the-world. By under-
standing Dasein as being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger explicated the question of being in 
terms of the practical orientation we exhibit 
towards the world and others.  
 
At the same time, Being-in-the-world is a 
collapse between Dasein and world. We come 
to understand ourselves only in light of the 
everyday contexts we find ourselves already 
in. We do not know a hammer from the de-
tached perspective as just another epistemic 
object. Rather, we know the hammer from the 
contextual significance it possesses in a nexus 
of instrumental relationships in which it is 
used. Thus, phenomenology attempts to bring 
to light that which is concealed over or taken 
for granted. Phenomenological description 
brings into explicit relief the hidden contexts 
and purposes that underscore practical inter-
action with the world. This point can only fur-
ther be clarified if we explain understanding.  
 
Under a hermeneutic conception, Dasein 
is centrally characterized as understanding, 
but as I have already emphasized this concep-
tion of understanding does not mean under-
standing only as knowledge. Understanding is 
not primarily a formal conception of 
knowledge that epistemologists analyze and 
consider primitively - basic to human experi-
ence. Rather, understanding is the implicit 
intelligibility that characterizes human activi-
ties as meaningful and already familiar in 
practice. When we understand objects, we 
understand them as neither objects with ex-
ternal properties, nor an explanation that at-
tempts to stand over a phenomenon in a 
transhistorical sense either (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 182/143). Instead, understanding is a pri-
mordial disclosure of possibilities of the 
world as a whole or the possibilities that per-
tain to my self-understanding as a historically 
mediated being thrown into the world.  
 
Ontically, we often claim “to understand 
something” but for Heidegger we have to be 
clear. The ontic interpretations are those con-
cealed over in the public cliché attitudes and 
natural attitude in Husserl and Scheler. Ontic 
explanations are unexamined and offer no 
primordial investigation of a fundamental on-
tology that hermeneutic phenomenology can. 
Heidegger offered a fundamental ontology 
through a hermeneutic phenomenology. He 
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described the ontological facticity of Dasein 
as the structure of care (Sorge). In the struc-
ture of care Heidegger described understand-
ing as an existentiale - an ontologically con-
stitutive characteristic of Dasein at pre-
cognitive the layer of experience. Through the 
existentiales, one experiences the world. Ac-
cordingly, understanding is not a competence, 
but Being as existing, or what we might call a 
Being-possible. It is a way of existing. A can-
didate passage might help clarify:  
 
In understanding, as an existentiale, that 
which we have such competence over is 
not a “what”, but Being as existing. The 
kind of Being which Dasein has, as poten-
tiality-for-being, lies existentially in un-
derstanding. Dasein is not something pre-
sent-at-hand which possesses its compe-
tence for something by way of an extra; it 
is primarily Being-possible. (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 183/143) 
 
As seen above, Dasein is its “possibilities,” 
and those possibilities pertain not only to it-
self but how it understands Being as existing, 
as it already is thrown into the world. These 
possibilities are never independent of the 
world in the way we described in Scheler. In 
other words, Heidegger does not think that 
possibilities are “free-floating potentiality-for-
being in the sense of the liberty of indiffer-
ence” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 183/144). In this 
way, possibilities are not like the “proposi-
tionalized” maxims of Kantian moral philoso-
phy that have their source in something else 
other than being-in-the-world. Instead, Dasein 
is ontologically understood as its possibilities.  
 
However, possibilities come already fur-
nished in a world not of our own making. 
Heidegger wrote 
 
As the potentiality-for-being which is is, it 
has let such possibilities pass by; it is con-
stantly waiving the possibilities of its Be-
ing, or else it seizes upon them and makes 
mistakes. But this means that Dasein is 
Being-possible which has been delivered 
over to itself - thrown possibility through 
and through. Dasein is the possibility of 
Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-
for-being. Its Being-possible is transparent 
to itself in different possible ways and de-
grees. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 183/144) 
 
In other words, Dasein is an undetermined 
potentiality full of possibilities it may choose 
for itself. Sometimes, it will make mistakes in 
that choosing, but it seizes upon those possi-
bilities nonetheless. Accordingly, Dasein 
must be handed over to itself as a field of po-
tential possibilities it may choose, and the 
formation of these possibilities is not com-
pletely within human control. There is a 
world already underway we are born into. We 
are thrown into the world. There are legacies 
shaping the direction and field of history I 
must and cannot help but respond to in my 
vocation. When I teach philosophy, I have 
come to expect that students from poorer are-
as have less developed writing skills on aver-
age than those that come from more affluent 
areas. While this is not always the case, a part 
of this problem places undue burdens on me 
as a teacher of philosophy in a public Ameri-
can university. I have to work harder at get-
ting clear what a text says to my students due 
in large measure by their lack of preparation 
for university life. I have to develop cultural 
references that might be analogous to the life 
of students far removed from philosophical 
texts. These legacies of under-preparation, 
failing high schools, and open admissions 
subsist even if I had never chosen to be a phi-
losopher teaching at a public university. In 
another sense, however, these possibilities are 
mine and mine alone. I am the one who was 
assigned such and such a course with enrol-
ling first-year students. All of these factors 
shape my situation. As Heidegger insisted, it 
is a matter of “degree.” 
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Dasein is thrown, and thus understanding 
takes into account the whole of a situation, 
and has a basic idea of its capabilities already 
but possession of this self-knowledge is not 
guaranteed. Dasein can fail to recognize that 
it is essentially its ownmost possibility. Un-
derstanding can go astray. Heidegger summa-
rized his complete definition of understand-
ing: “Understanding is the existential Being 
of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-being; and it 
is so in such a way that this Being discloses in 
itself what its Being is capable of” (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 184/144). To unpack this conception, 
Dasein is that which has its own being as it 
issue for it. We are in possession of our own 
possibility. This possession is not mysterious, 
but it is a structure exhibited in our everyday 
daily experience. In this way, the possibilities 
are concrete. In an intimate way, we know 
what we are capable of since an intimate fa-
miliarity with our own being is disclosed in a 
very practical orientation towards the world.  
 
Let me take stock of what has been estab-
lished thus far. For Heidegger, possibilities 
were not a deliberated choice, or a detached 
belief that will inform action later on. These 
possibilities are concretized in a particular 
context of significance. These possibilities are 
already present in a world we are thrown into, 
and the possession of these possibilities occur 
in matters of degree. These possibilities are 
always relative to a worldly situation. Under-
standing is always practically-oriented in a 
context - this is what Heidegger meant by 
calling the projected understanding a “for-the-
sake-of-which” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 182/143). 
By being constantly affixed to the worldly 
concrete possibilities and situational character, 
Heidegger introduced a distinction between 
factuality and facticity. Let me explain the 
distinction.  
 
Many past thinkers have argued what is 
possible by connecting those inferences about 
possibility to what someone is “factually.” 
For example, Aristotle’s doctrine of natural 
slavery in the Politics largely depends on 
metaphysical assumptions. (Aristotle, 1254a, 
pp. 28-32) For Aristotle, a thing possesses its 
nature inherent within it, and as such, the dis-
tinction between those that rule and those that 
are ruled inheres in the nature of individuals. 
In another way, the pseudoscience of phre-
nology in the 19th century “secured” the truth 
of racist attitudes. In addition, understanding 
“agency” in moral philosophy has gravitated 
towards attempting to construct moral theo-
ries by first examining how humans operate 
socially through social psychology.2  This is 
an attempt at establishing what we are factual-
ly rather than looking at how it is we exist as 
being-in-the-world. The latter emphasizes the 
facticity of human life over what Aristotle, 
pseudoscience or the use of moral psychology 
can do for us in ethics. The point in raising 
these examples is to open up Dasein’s worldly 
structure but at the same time being aware of 
what Heidegger is not claiming. Dasein could 
never be discerned from what it is factually. 
Instead, “Dasein is ‘more’ than it factually is, 
supposing that one might want to make an 
inventory of it as something-at-hand and list 
the contents of its Being… ” (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 185/145). Therefore, again, Dasein 
cannot be known by simply listing off the 
properties of its being as a scientific perspec-
tive might insist. Instead, Heidegger’s analy-
sis is an existential-ontological account of 
how the projection of self-understanding can 
become “what it is by becoming what is pos-
sible for it to be” (Hoy, 1993, p. 181). In or-
der to understand what one may become, in-
terpretation is required since we must be able 
to interpret the already possessed conception 
of who we want to become. For my purposes 
here, the possibilities can thus be interpreted 
as “modes of givenness” and interpretation 
imposes the limit of how those modes of 
givenness can be understood. 
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By interpretation (Auslegung), Heidegger 
meant a practically-oriented capacity of un-
derstanding to bring into view the parts and 
wholes of an entire possibility and context. 
Put another way, interpretation is the devel-
opment of the understanding’s projection up-
on what is inherently possible. In Heidegger’s 
words, an interpretation is “the working out of 
possibilities projected in understanding” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 189/148). Thus, we must 
already have a worked out understanding of 
possibilities prior to interpretation since inter-
pretation is grounded in the understanding. 
Understanding is never generated out of in-
terpretation. Instead, understanding is the pre-
reflective, pre-linguistic, and pre-cognitive 
practical orientation that makes it possible to 
interpret the world at all. We understand as-
pects of the world already; we understand 
something-as-something. When I engage in 
reading a book, I understand the book as 
something to be read. The book occurs in the 
in-order-to relationships that constitute the 
whole world and the possible interpretations 
of it:  
 
That which is disclosed in understanding - 
that which is understood - is already ac-
cessible I such a way that its ‘as which’ 
can be made to stand out explicitly. The 
‘as’ makes up the structure of explicitness 
of something that is understood. It consti-
tutes the interpretation. (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 189/149) 
 
In other words, there is an implicit back-
ground to the world, a nexus of practical rela-
tionships behind understanding and interpret-
ing the world that Heidegger called the “total-
ity of involvements.” I possess an intimate 
familiarity with many of these practical rela-
tionships already. For Heidegger, we are born 
into a world already underway within its own 
historicity and, likewise, all interpretations are 
a working out of projective understanding in 
that historicity and totality of involvements.   
 
The totality of involvements is always un-
derstood not as a grasping of facts inde-
pendently of that historicity and already un-
derstood contexts of significance. Instead, the 
totality of involvements is what Heidegger 
called “ready-to-hand” (Zuhanden). We do 
not apprehend properties about objects out-
side of the interpretively-laden contexts we 
inhabit. Such an apprehension would exem-
plify what Heidegger called “present-at-hand” 
(Vorhanden). Moreover, this holds for value 
too. As Heidegger put it, “in interpreting we 
do not throw a signification over some naked 
thing which is present-at-hand, we do not 
stick a value on it…” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
190/150). In other words, interpretations can-
not get outside of the contextual significance. 
Instead, this hermeneutic threshold holds for 
value. For instance, values are not disclosed 
as a mind-independent property through a 
type of moral intuition.3 In the totality of in-
volvements, there are three pre-linguistic/pre-
cognitive features that condition interpretation 
and further the hermeneutic threshold already 
described. As Heidegger put it, “an interpreta-
tion is never a presuppositionless apprehend-
ing” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 191/150). 
 
First, there is fore-having (Vorhabe). We 
have a prior understanding that does not stand 
out clearly from the background. We under-
stand the bridge is something to cross prior 
the practical involvement of driving. Second-
ly, there is fore-sight (Vorsicht). This is the 
act of appropriation in which the interpreter 
brings into relief an already understood but 
veiled aspect of a thing, and this is what is 
responsible for conceptualization of a thing 
for interpretation. Finally, Heidegger de-
scribed fore-conception (Vorgriff). This is the 
already decided and definite way of conceiv-
ing the thing to be interpreted “either with 
finality or with reservations; it is grounded in 
something we grasp in advance—in a fore-
conception” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 191/150). 
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All three factors describe the fore-structure. 
These three features constitute the hermeneu-
tic threshold that interpretation imposes upon 
what is possible for us.  
 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is not simp-
ly a description about the limits of under-
standing and interpretations. Those are cer-
tainly part of it, yet it is more. For me, herme-
neutic phenomenology is the fusion of the as-
structure and fore-structure in Heidegger. The 
fore-structure is the particular way in which 
the whole “must already have understood 
what is to be interpreted” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
194/152). Hermeneutic phenomenology is the 
descriptive attempt to bring the as-structures 
and fore-structures together in which together 
they form an articulation.4 The as-structure is 
the thing “as its own” but such a thing is giv-
en as part of a contextual whole. Their togeth-
erness delimits how projective understanding 
actually works. In projective understanding,  
 
…entities are disclosed in their possibility. 
The character of the possibility corre-
sponds, on each occasion, with the kind of 
the entity which is understood. Entities 
within-the-world generally are projected 
upon the world—that is, upon the whole 
of significance, to whose reference-
relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, 
has been tied up in advance. (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 192/151)  
 
In other words, projective understanding is 
limited by the part-whole relation disclosed in 
the as-structure and fore-structure.  
 
To say that understanding works out pos-
sibilities for interpretation within the part-
whole relationship is not to commit oneself to 
circular reasoning. It is not a “vicious circle” 
as Heidegger insisted. Instead, interpretation 
is an effort to see more than simply an ideal 
of knowledge operating as pure philosophiz-
ing but rather “a positive possibility of the 
most primordial kind of knowing” (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 195/153). Heidegger’s phenomeno-
logical description of understanding limits the 
very possibility of phenomenological ontolo-
gy itself. More generally, many philosophers 
have imposed the standards of deductive rigor 
upon discourses in philosophy. These rigor-
ous discourses attempt to get at the truth of a 
discourse. Yet, such an imposition of an ideal 
of knowledge is still a species of projective 
understanding. In the Crisis of the European 
Sciences, Husserl phenomenologically re-
trieved how the sedimentation of historical 
meaning in Galileo had “mathematized” na-
ture to the point that nature itself could only 
be understood scientifically as an event within 
space-time.5 Such events could not be given 
any other way. Quite similarly, Heidegger’s 
insistence on the priority of practical engage-
ment with the world is a similar insight. 
Heidegger’s efforts return to what is given, 
and at the same time, the return establishes a 
limit that neither understanding nor interpreta-
tion can surpass. This would include how val-
ues could be given, if at all.  
 
III. Phenomenological Tensions 
 
The differences in these respective philoso-
phies illustrate two ways values can be inter-
preted. First, Scheler’s silence on the ontolo-
gy of value follows from his phenomenologi-
cal attitude. From the earlier passage, Scheler 
regarded the “given only in the seeing and 
experiencing of the act itself.” In the sphere of 
acts, we could discern the essences of things, 
but this essential insight cannot glean any on-
tological insight. Scheler was a thoroughly 
committed pure phenomenologist at that point, 
and the ontological neutrality of the attitude 
of “spiritual seeing” does not seek to delimit 
that which can be given. Scheler’s insistence 
on the immediate givenness of value through 
emotional intuition expresses that spirit may 
discern the what-ness of a phenomenon, yet 
we are never told anything about what es-
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sences are anymore than how it is that values 
are given as an eternal a priori order of ranks. 
On the other hand, Dasein cannot immediate 
intuitively apprehend a phenomenon. Accord-
ing to Heidegger, all understanding is – to put 
it in Scheler’s words – “mediated” through 
“signs and symbols.” Therefore, it is clear that 
insofar as the analysis regards the Formal-
ismus and Being and Time, there are clear 
contradictory commitments to either a phe-
nomenology that can discern essences imme-
diately through intuition or a hermeneutic 
phenomenology in which the understanding 
works out its interpretive possibilities mediat-
ed through the as-and-fore-structures of expe-
rience. If someone is given the choice be-
tween these two approaches, the question can 
be asked: Which approach allows for a better 
understanding of value’s givenness?  
 
In the Nature of Sympathy, Scheler argued 
that existence is pervasively already mooded - 
that is to say, Scheler’s insistence that affec-
tivity pervades human life is that such affec-
tivity is being-in-the-world. I offer the follow-
ing passage as evidence of this interpretation:  
 
…the value-qualities of objects are al-
ready given in advance at a level where 
their imaged and conceptual features are 
not yet vouchsafed to us, and hence that 
the apprehension of values is the basis of 
our subsequent apprehension of objects. 
(Scheler, 2008, p. 57-58) 
We are actively borne into a world engrossed 
in an emotional tonality. Human life is thor-
oughly “mooded” in Scheler.  Consequently, 
there is agreement with the Heideggerian in-
sistence on Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and 
how the care structure unfolds emphasizing 
“moodedness.” Scheler’s analysis takes affec-
tivity farther than Being and Time. He gives 
full phenomenological independence to affec-
tive intentionality whereas moods are just one 
existentiale in the care structure. 
 
For it is our whole spiritual life - and not 
simply objective thinking in the sense of 
cognition of being - that possesses “pure” 
acts and laws of acts which are, according 
to their nature and contents, independent 
of the human organization. The emotive 
elements of spirit, such as feeling, prefer-
ring, loving, hating and willing, also pos-
sess original a priori contents which are 
not borrowed from “thinking”, and which 
ethics must show to be independent of 
logic. There is an a priori ordre du Coeur, 
or logique du Coeur as Blaise Pascal aptly 
calls it. (Scheler, 1973a, p. 63) 
 
Scheler considered the experience of affec-
tivity as the basis for all other experiences. In 
Heidegger, the moods are experienced in 
much the same way as Scheler. They are a co-
penetrating part of the structure of care. 
Moods come from behind us, without our 
control, and we are constantly delivered over 
to them. Every situation is mooded, and there-
fore given as already mooded as such. In this 
way, both Scheler and Heidegger emphasized 
the same primordial level of affectivity in 
which all situations and the world itself is dis-
closed. Yet, there is a striking difference be-
tween both phenomenological approaches. In 
Scheler, the emotions form an independent 
autonomous logic disclosed in the structure of 
intentional acts. In Heidegger, the moods 
work alongside the other existentiales. This 
autonomous logic is the reason why Scheleri-
an phenomenology is capable of grasping the 
values intended in emotions more fully than 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, 
and explains why Heidegger could not ade-
quately grasp values in the everydayness of 
Dasein.  
 
The givenness of value-qualities in expe-
rience, when successfully bracketed phenom-
enologically, perdure. That is, values are giv-
en as a form of intransient permanence as ev-
idenced in acts of love. These acts are of spirit, 
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and they disclose values as objectively valid 
in their own way. Consider the experience of 
love. Love is a personal intentional act that 
opens up the grasp of value’s givenness of an-
other’s spiritual essence. These others could 
be other persons, an anonymous other – such 
as other Americans, or maybe an idea like jus-
tice. Either way, the structure of love is the 
same intentional act and offers us phenome-
nological insight into the experience of values 
itself. In love, I will adopt a permanent intran-
sient orientation to sacrifice all my effort to 
bring the other to proper fruition. I will not 
attempt to control, manipulate, or dominate 
this other. Control, domination, or manipula-
tion would only attempt to bring about an im-
posed conception of what the other should be 
rather than allowing the unique other to be. 
Hence, love is the movement or ascendancy 
of Scheler’s value-rankings that allows the 
valued good to become more than what it is, 
and at the highest level is the absolute value 
of the person. Being capable of experiencing 
value’s givenness requires eliminating any 
mediation such that the experience can pick 
upon value’s overwhelming fullness. The 
overwhelming fullness of value’s givenness is 
a conceptual feature of value itself.  
 
It could be proposed that Heidegger 
picked up on the givenness of value as a form 
of permanence, but Heidegger held value to 
be an ontic phenomenon that naively regard 
values as present-at-hand. As Heidegger first 
mentioned ethics in Being and Time  
 
Dasein’s ways of behavior, its capacities, 
powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, 
have been studied with varying extent in 
philosophical psychology, in anthropolo-
gy, ethics, and ‘political science’, in poet-
ry, biography and in the writing of history 
each in a different fashion…Only when 
the basic structures of Dasein have been 
adequately worked out with explicit orien-
tation towards the problem of Being itself, 
will what we have hitherto gained in in-
terpreting Dasein gets its existential justi-
fication. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 37/16) 
 
For Heidegger, ethics is but one example of 
an ontic interpretation that does not go far 
enough in elucidating the Being of Dasein. 
Heidegger thought that various ontic interpre-
tations of Dasein’s possibilities had been 
overlooked and concealed over. In a sense, 
Heidegger was correct, yet had Heidegger ex-
plored the ground of values as “felt in experi-
ence,” he would have gleaned Scheler’s in-
sight. I hope the reader understands I am not 
simply “playing up” Scheler, but offering the 
givenness of value as a reason to regard 
Scheler’s phenomenology more sophisticated 
on this point. Phenomenologically speaking 
and independent of Scheler, values are given 
as enduring beyond contexts of significance. 
If I face a similar situation later on in life, 
then ceteris paribus the same value will apply 
to the same context of significance. Hence, 
we can understand it when Scheler claimed 
that the determinate order of values “is inde-
pendent of the form of being into which val-
ues enter - no matter, for instance, if they are 
present to us as purely objective qualities, as 
members of value-complexes (e.g., the being-
agreeable or being-beautiful of something), or 
as values that ‘a thing has’” (Scheler, 1973a, 
p. 17). Heidegger had only picked up on the 
givenness of value partly. Indeed, values are 
given as a presence perduring throughout time 
because the act-center of persons realizes 
them into time as goods.6 The act-center of 
persons in realizing values exceeds represen-
tation, and so too do the values realized by 
persons.  
 
An example might prove helpful. Scheler 
stated that values only matter in relation to the 
dignity of a person, and this is the highest 
value (which for Scheler is the value of the 
Holy). Therefore, if I enslave another person, 
I disregard how he is given to me in experi-
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ence as a person. This insight is gleaned in the 
emotional apprehension I have in relation to a 
person. The dignity of a person does not come 
to us through the a priori form of the moral 
law as a Kantian would insist. Instead, the 
inviolable sense of the person is given in her 
inexhaustible richness as a wholly unique in-
dividuated being. The person emanates out-
ward phenomenologically as absolute and 
unique. It does not matter if we are talking 
about the slaves of Ancient Egypt, or slaves in 
the American South of the 19th century. In all 
instances, the value of the person is felt in ex-
perience. There is no mediation of the value 
attached to the holy sense afforded to person. 
In much the same way, Levinas insisted on 
the transhistorical absolute value of the other. 
It is therefore no mistake that Levinas and 
Scheler insisted on the trans-historical and 
therefore trans-mediated sense that the other 
person possesses. No ethics can get off the 
ground if there was not a phenomenological 
givenness of the person and value itself. In 
short, ethicists assume the phenomenological 
existence of values and persons as a basis for 
their own inquiry.   
 
A Heideggerian might counter we have 
simply paid too much attention to the as-
structure, the immediate immanence of a per-
son without paying attention to what context 
or fore-structure that allows us to make such 
claims as when Scheler opens in the Second 
Preface to the Formalismus with “The spirit 
behind my ethics is one of rigid ethical abso-
lutism and objectivism” (Scheler, 1973a, p. 
xxiii). Consequently, it is no accident that the 
next sentence follows as “My position may in 
another respect be called emotional intuition-
ism” (Scheler 1973a, p. xxiii). By contrast, 
one could agree with Gadamer’s sentiments 
surrounding Scheler’s thought. Scheler’s ma-
jor ethics merely “fused the tradition of Cath-
olic moral philosophy for the first time with 
the most advanced positions in modern phi-
losophy” (Gadamer, 2008, p. 135). By “mod-
ern philosophy,” Gadamer referred to phe-
nomenology and its supplementary role to a 
metaphysics informed by philosophical an-
thropology. Scheler’s contribution is down-
played if a hermeneutic phenomenology in 
either Gadamer or Heidegger’s formation 
succeeds. Yet, hermeneutic phenomenology is 
limited by its inability to capture the absolute 
immanence of value-experience. There is no 
mediation in Scheler’s thought of value expe-
rience. This follows from Scheler’s commit-
ment to a phenomenology of essences ex-
pressed in the interconnections between emo-
tional acts and value-correlates.  
 
Interconnections are, like essences, “giv-
en”. They are not a “product” of “under-
standing.” They are original thing-
interconnections [Sachzusammenhänge], 
not laws of objects just because they are 
laws of acts apprehending objects.7 They 
are “a priori” because they are grounded 
in essences [Wesenheit], not in objects and 
goods. They are a priori, but not because 
of “understanding” or “reason” “produces” 
them. The logos permeating the universe 
can be grasped only through them. (Schel-
er, 1973a, p. 68)  
 
The givenness of value shares in a completely 
different mode of givenness - more than 
Heidegger could anticipate in Being and Time 
- and this is why it is unfair to insist upon the 
hermeneutic threshold without fully paying 
attention to the how-of-givenness and what 
that how-of-givenness entails for value in par-
ticular. The givenness of value could only be 
articulated in a phenomenology of emotional 
life where they are experienced directly. For 
instance, if I find myself likely to eat fish 
from Lake Erie, I will refrain. Lake Erie is 
very polluted, and the game wardens in Penn-
sylvania near Presque Isle warn of the dangers. 
The fish are given as threatening my health. 
Moreover, I come to value my health over the 
pleasurable desire to eat fish. I choose the vi-
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tal value of health over the lower pleasurable 
value. To experience value is to be thrust in 
situations in which values are given in rela-
tion to each other, and the phenomenological 
evidence of preferring acts indicates the high-
er values are chosen at the expense of those 
experienced as lower.  
 
Some might be dissatisfied with my inter-
pretation that Heidegger missed out on the 
givenness of value. It is not enough to elicit 
the motivations for why a philosopher has de-
fended a particular conclusion. Herein, I have 
offered the givenness of value as its own evi-
dence and this is why if a moral phenomenol-
ogy is to take shape, the phenomenology in 
question cannot adopt a Heideggerian frame. 
Instead, a moral phenomenology can only be 
founded on a phenomenology open to value in 
the first place, and unlike Heidegger, Scheler 
phenomenology accommodates value’s 
givenness. However, there are some limita-
tions even to Scheler’s approach.  
 
Scheler provided an account of moral 
phenomenology that disclosed the how-of-
givenness of values. However, in his ethics, 
he never provided a clear account as to what 
the content of values are, nor how that content 
is experienced. Instead, we know what value 
might be operative in a particular value-
complex or situation and the phenomenologi-
cal form of moral experience more generally. 
I feel a calling of the Holy and the values cor-
related to spiritual feeling but there are no 
specific duties or prescriptions as to how I 
instantiate that calling in my actions. With its 
dearth of a prescriptive element, Scheler’s 
moral phenomenology cannot take the form 
of a particular moral theory that privileges 
ways to decide what I ought to do, and by 
“moral theory,” I mean a philosophical meth-
od that provides agents with set procedures 
for moral deliberation, e.g., Kant’s categorical 
imperative or Mill’s greatest happiness prin-
ciple. At best, Scheler might endorse some 
type of virtue ethics in which phronesis is in-
volved in apprehending what values are sali-
ent to a particular value-complex, duty or per-
son, but this is a topic for another time.8   
 
In this paper, I have urged two conclu-
sions regarding the differences spelled out 
between Scheler’s intuition of essences and 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn. First, I have 
argued that the experience of value could not 
help but be given in terms of its presence-at-
hand nature. Persons and values, when 
viewed within time, resemble presence in the 
Heideggerian sense because of the excess of 
givenness overtakes the phenomenal appear-
ance and that overwhelming giveness of value 
is given immanently without mediation. 
Heidegger’s insistence that values are ontic 
follows from Heidegger’s incomplete grasp of 
how values are given in experience. The in-
transience of value is simply the manner in 
which it is given in experience. 
 
Scheler’s silence about the ontology of 
value in the Formalismus is a product of seek-
ing a phenomenological basis for ethics. Put 
simply, when we engage in phenomenological 
description, we are not to assume anything 
prior about the phenomenon, but let the phe-
nomenon show itself from itself. From this 
phenomenological neutrality, Scheler cannot 
settle anything about the question of values 
ontologically, but unlike Heidegger, Scheler’s 
phenomenology can capture the givenness of 
value. Scheler can say how values are experi-
enced in emotional intuition in preferring, 
loving, and hating, and that there may be les-
sons to learn from Heidegger. Heidegger’s 
efforts to “ontologize” phenomenological in-
quiry about factical life is a model for how 
Scheler’s efforts may be better developed - 
though my audience must wait for another 
time to address the Heideggerian suggestions 
for Scheler’s metaphysics yet to come. At 
present, Scheler’s approach is more amiable 
to the givenness of persons and values and for 
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this reason. Scheler’s approach should be re-
garded as the better hermeneutic framework 
whenever such frameworks concern values in 
lived-experience.  
 
IV. Application 
 
In this last section, I hope some of my efforts 
have opened up eidetic seeing about values. 
The earlier sections provide reasons why we 
ought to favor Scheler’s phenomenology of 
value over and above Heidegger’s hermeneu-
tic phenomenology. Scheler’s unique vision 
for a phenomenology of value has intellectual 
merit. His phenomenology of value accom-
modates the very experience of values. This 
unique vision is superior to Heidegger’s her-
meneutic phenomenology, and the overall 
ambition of this essay has appealed to the 
phenomenological evidence of value itself as 
a way to decide this issue. For non-
phenomenologically-inclined thinkers, such a 
solution may seem rather obtuse. Put differ-
ently, the interest in hermeneutic approaches 
to problems of human experience cannot ac-
commodate the experience of values if her-
meneutics is restricted to embody 
Heideggerian-inspired approaches. I choose to 
address Heideggerian hermeneutic phenome-
nology since Heidegger’s thought has inspired 
so many. Beyond the concerns with “theory,” 
let me provide an example why this insight is 
crucial to those interested in hermeneutic 
method and application to cultural practices.  
 
Over the last four years, health care acces-
sibility has been the subject of intense debate 
in the United States. Ever since the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA hereafter), the 
politics of the United States have been divid-
ed between those that think reform need not 
involve any alteration of how health care is 
made accessible in the United States via pri-
vate companies and those that believe in pub-
lic insurance. Until the ACA, a person’s abil-
ity to access health care service depended 
very much on whether one’s job provided 
health care insurance. In the United States, 
private companies provide insurance benefits 
attached to one’s employment. For the under-
employed, the jobless and those with preexist-
ing conditions, these people cannot acquire 
insurance easily or not at all, and the only re-
course these at risk populations is to access 
health care services provided by the Emer-
gency Room in the hospital. Federal law pro-
hibits hospitals from turning away anybody, 
but this option often puts the uninsured in ex-
treme financial debt if the problem is severe, 
and hospitals will not go out of their way to 
serve the uninsured. In January 2014, howev-
er, the ACA will require all Americans to 
purchase insurance and employers of all types 
will be required now to offer insurance. This 
requirement is called the “universal mandate.” 
 
Let us, now, assume that one wanted to 
interpret this political situation. In light of 
feelings of the uninsured prior to the Afforda-
ble Care Act, a Heideggerian frame could 
pick up on the anxiety felt of those in the situ-
ation. The anxious mood and suffering of 
one’s health might reveal aspects of our 
finitude, even possibly revealing aspects of 
our own being-towards-death depending on 
the severity of one’s health problem. Anxiety 
can individuate the experiencer and even ar-
rest us from our immersed social self to the 
point where we achieve an authentic existence 
(Eigenlichkeit). Yet, anxiety is not love. Anx-
iety only brings to light my possibilities for 
action as a finite being and, in its deepest rev-
elation about my own possibilities in the call 
of conscience. I am not called to serve others 
as much as I am only aware of myself as anx-
ious. My own freedom and the tenuous re-
solve to face my situation constitute all I am 
capable of doing. Applied to one’s personal 
health, this deep revelation of anxiety can on-
ly inform me as to how I relate to the environ-
ing world. For Scheler, anxiety is felt in the 
vital sphere of values. Love allows us to as-
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cend past this value sphere and acquire 
knowledge of values beyond the personal in-
dividuated experience anxiety causes within 
us. Heidegger has no order of preferring with-
in his limited conception of hermeneutic phe-
nomenology to acquire knowledge of values 
beyond the personal individuated experience 
of anxiety.  
 
Love allows us to grasp higher values and 
realize them in the service of the other. Reli-
ant upon Scheler’s act of preferring, or what 
we could call value-ception (Wertnehmung), 
persons can glean the values given in our ex-
perience of the world whereas Heidegger can 
only pick up on the moodedness of a situation 
as it pertains to Dasein’s concern only, but not 
the value-correlates attached to those moods. 
In this way, Heideggerian hermeneutics could 
not do appropriate justice in understanding 
the moral imperative necessary to engage in a 
political dialogue about how best to solve the 
anxiety of having little or no reliable access to 
health care services. Love is the name of 
those intentional acts where we ascend in 
Scheler’s value rankings to the highest value 
of the person. In this way, love enables the 
growth beyond the vital sphere to solving the 
problem felt in the vital sphere. We can see 
this insight in Kenneth Stikkers’s work on 
Scheler. He wrote 
 
Contemporary Western culture, for exam-
ple, is to be understood as an utilty-value 
ethos increasingly dominated by economy 
- what Scheler describes the “ethos of in-
dustrialism” - and to grasp this fact is to 
gain the single most penetrating insight 
into that culture. (Stikkers, 1986, p. 250) 
 
In light of this passage, Stikkers continued 
and showed what the idea of economy looks 
like as we ascend in value. Starting from the 
lowest value at the top and ascending in love, 
economic concerns look very different at eve-
ry level. Love is the grasping of higher values 
over lower ones, and the movement in the 
various value-spheres, as the example of eco-
nomic concerns below, would be based on 
love that would eventually culminate in the 
Holy. Thus, economics understood through 
the various value-spheres in Scheler’s thought 
would resemble the following schema.  
 
- pleasure: hedonistic consumerism 
- utility: as measured, e.g., by money units 
- vital values: as found in the original life- 
communal meaning of “Oikonomia” viz., 
care of the home 
- spiritual values: e.g., when economies 
primary interest is justice 
- the Holy: e.g., when labor is experienced 
as participation in God’s ongoing creation 
and as an act of creation. (Stikkers, 1986, 
p. 251) 
 
The ACA’s universal mandate that every-
one buy public insurance is based on love. If 
healthier people buy into a nation-wide insur-
ance pool, the cost of uninsured people will 
no longer drive up costs for those that have 
insurance, and the universal mandate compels 
obedience so that more people can afford to 
purchase it. The ACA is motivated by provid-
ing access to the economically disenfran-
chised already tending both towards the spir-
itual value of justice and the Holy.  
 
Contrary to ascension, Conservative ad-
vocates mostly favor an entirely free market 
solution. Such solutions privilege the man-
agement of one’s home and projection of 
one’s own self-interest against what would be 
in the interest of others. The fact that the uni-
versal mandate compels people by law to pur-
chase a service they might not want or need is 
interpreted as going against their own self-
interest. In the vital sphere, we can feel the 
value of anxiousness, but anxiousness, as I 
criticize Heidegger is self-referential. The 
violation of liberty often spoken about by op-
ponents of the ACA is based on a conception 
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of liberty-as-self-interested. Yet, the entire 
system prior to the ACA viewed the unin-
sured as people incapable of paying and ex-
cludes them economically. To this day, the 
health care system seeks to profit from treat-
ing patients as consumers rather than the indi-
vidual person.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
When it comes to value-experience, there are 
few approaches in philosophy that can thema-
tize experience. Phenomenology is one ap-
proach to describing lived-experience.9 Yet, 
the lived-experience of value is unique. Val-
ues have a special mode of givenness, and as 
such, the phenomenological commitments of 
Scheler and Heidegger prevent or enable that 
mode of givenness to be seen. In this essay, I 
argued that if we pay attention to the 
givenness of value itself as an enduring im-
manent presence, I can determine which ap-
proach can accommodate the givenness of 
value. As a phenomenologist, I want to allow 
for the phenomenon of value to shine forth on 
its own merits, and I devoted considerable 
attention to see how value could manifest in 
both approaches.  
 
In Heidegger’s thought, values are either 
not gleaned at all or only partially. The prin-
cipal figure in the development of twentieth 
century hermeneutics is Heidegger. Heidegger 
also eclipses the importance of Scheler’s phe-
nomenology, and yet only in Scheler’s phe-
nomenology is the core of value-experience 
truly manifest. For those outside of philoso-
phy but still interested in the application of 
hermeneutic insight into cultural practices are 
better served by adopting Scheler’s phenome-
nology when addressing the reality of value-
experience. I attempted to show this insight in 
the example Stikkers applied to economics 
itself. This application allowed for us to see 
that despite the prominent appeal of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, 
Scheler’s phenomenology of value allows for 
a deeper insight into cultural practices. 
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Notes 
 
1 The priority of this type of act is central to 
the entire sphere of moral experience in 
Scheler.  
 
2 The turning point of this in the most recent 
literature and attraction to social psychology 
would probably be Gilbert Harman’s “Moral 
Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue 
Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Er-
ror” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety 99 (1998-1999): pp. 315-333. It is fair to 
say that this probably goes as far back Hume. 
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume’s 
attempt at describing the moral sciences at-
tempts to discern limited to normative theo-
ry by appeals to Hume’s psychology about 
sympathetic identification.  
 
3 This holds really for any conception of phi-
losophy that apprehends or discovers mind-
independent truths. Such examples in some 
moral philosophy disobey this hermeneutic 
threshold that Heidegger sees as constrain-
ing all inquiry. R. Schafer-Landau is the 
most recent defense of moral intuitionism in 
his Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2003). Similarly, this 
hermeneutic limit has consequences for any 
realism about science, art, ethics or wherev-
er such efforts attempt at grasping the struc-
ture itself without seeing such efforts as op-
erative in a context already. These condi-
tions also elicit Heidegger’s suspicion about 
metaphysics and why it is that we must call 
for the de-structuring of metaphysics. 
 
 
4 It is no surprise that so much time is spent 
on logos as a gathering together (legein) and 
letting-be in Heidegger’s essay Early Greek 
Thinking.  
 
5 It is fair to say that beyond a transcenden-
tal idealistic phenomenology, Husserl’s 
draw to sedimentation is an influence of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn.  
 
6  This is a point of contention in Parvis 
Emad’s brilliantly argued Heidegger and the 
Phenomeology of Value (Torey Press: Glen 
Ellyn, IL, 1984). In that work, Emad thinks 
the difference between Heidegger and 
Scheler turns on Scheler’s acceptance of 
traditional concepts of the person that 
presuppose a temporality of presence. 
Heidegger, Emad insists, works out a 
completely different account of temporality 
that questions Scheler’s acceptance of a 
traditional metaphysics concealed in his 
commitment to intentional acts as products 
of spirit (and likewise the whole of Western 
metaphysics for that matter). “The a-
temporal nature of spirit is clearly manifest 
in its sole representative, the act. The nature 
of act is such that it does not exist in time. 
To use Scheler’s terminology, acts exercise 
their influence into time without being 
extended in it…like the tradition criticized 
by Heidegger, Scheler is unaware of the 
subtle, hidden and elusive role of time” (p. 
47) While I do not have the space here to 
revisit the entire presentation of Emad’s 
argument, Emad’s book only takes up the 
Heideggerian confidence in that line without 
asking first what the givenness of value is 
itself. The alternative explanation for 
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Scheler’s lack of awareness about time is 
simple. Values are given in such excess that, 
like persons, they exhibit a type of givenness 
that cannot be captured in time. The 
givenness is a vertical dimension, given in 
height and only partially understood in the 
horizon of time articulated in hermeneutic 
phenomenology.  
 
7  On its own laws apprehending objects 
would be a form of naïve realism or version 
of either epistemic or moral intuitionism.  
 
8 While I do not have time to review the 
literature on this point, I am especially 
attracted to Eugene Kelly’s recent efforts to 
marry virtue ethics, Scheler, and Hartmann. 
For more information on this view, see his 
“Between Scheler and Hartmann: Some 
Problems of a Material Value Ethics” in 
Ethics and Phenomenology. Ed. Mark 
Sanders and J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012): p. 39-
56. Those parties interested in Scheler may 
also read his “On the Rehabilitation of 
Virtue” trans. Eugene Kelly (2005) in 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 
79(1), 21-37.  
 
9 American pragmatism is the other side of 
philosophy that regards experience as 
primary.  
